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For most of the nineteenth and twentieth century, universal conscription
has been by far the predominant system of military recruitment, but the
phenomenon has received surprisingly little attention from social historians.2
This lack of attention is all the more surprising if one considers the interest-
ing position occupied by conscription at the crossroads of wage and non-
wage labour and free and unfree labour.
The following articles by Khaled Fahmy, Erik Jan Zu¨rcher and Stephanie
Cronin deal with the spread of the conscription system in one specific area
(the Middle East) where it has been the most prominent feature of the
establishment of increased and centralized state control over societies which,
until relatively recent times, consisted of largely self-sufficient agrarian com-
munities with very little contact with the outside world. The introduction
of universal conscription confronted both states and populations with
entirely new demands and problems.
In order to understand the specific characteristics of the system, a com-
parative approach is necessary, placing it in the context of two repertoires:
that of the options facing states in search of military resources and that of
the options open to individuals, communities and entire societies defending
their interests in the face of the demands made by the state. Conscription,
after all, is only one form of recruitment of soldiers, feasible and desirable
only under a specific set of conditions, so to be understood it has to be
studied within the framework of military recruitment through the ages.
In adopting this comparative approach, we aim to draw attention to the
similarities between the developments in Europe and in the Middle East,
thus bringing out the dynamics inherent in different systems and, inciden-
1. The articles by Khaled Fahmy, Erik Jan Zu¨rcher and Stephanie Cronin were presented as
papers during a symposium organized jointly by the International Institute of Social History and
the Middle East Institute of the University of Nijmegen, on the occasion of the latter’s fiftieth
anniversary. The symposium was held in Nijmegen, Netherlands, on 2–3 October 1997. We wish
to thank the organizers in Nijmegen for their generous hospitality. The complete proceedings of
the symposium will be published as Erik Jan Zu¨rcher (ed.), Conscription in the Middle East
(London, forthcoming).
2. There is a sizeable literature on conscription by military historians. It is, however, devoted
almost exclusively to North America and Europe. Martin Anderson, Conscription. A Select and
Annotated Bibliography (Stanford, CA, 1976), has 413 pages of entries, of which 20 are devoted to
countries other than the US and the UK. The countries dealt with under ‘‘other foreign countries’’
are exclusively European or British Empire dominions.
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tally, contributing to the struggle against orientalism and its essentialist
division of the world into ‘‘civilizations’’.3
A useful way of addressing this problem is by making use of the model
proposed by Charles Tilly regarding state-building through war and state
monopolization of violence.4 This implies a continuous rejuvenation of the
state, including its armed forces, not simply or solely as a reaction to outside
threats, but as a response to continuous changes in the availability of
resources.
In the Tilly model, the tax-raising potential of a state is essential for the
choice of a particular recruitment system and consequently for the possibil-
ities of resistance. Thus in the following we shall make a distinction between
the situations where taxation is not an option and those where it is,
especially from the towns. In the latter case, a division of labour may occur
between towns with essentially defensive militias and the much more offen-
sive army of the state. With the help of the money raised through taxation,
the state basically has a choice of three strategies: recruitment of unfree men
(subjects, subjugated or purchased) who may or may not be paid; recruit-
ment in exchange for wages on the national or international labour market;
and recruitment of free subjects, who are fed and clothed, but not paid
anything like a normal wage. In this last-named strategy, the free subjects
may be volunteers or they may be conscripts – in which case their freedom
is obviously severely limited.
We will now attempt a brief overview, a catalogue, of forms of recruit-
ment employed in the Islamic Middle East, set against the background of
developments in Europe in the early modern and modern period.
Taking as point of departure the ability of the state to raise taxes for
military purposes, we may discern four major types of recruitment of men
for the army and navy in the Middle East and Europe between the late
seventeenth and early twentieth century: feudal recruitment, unfree recruit-
ment, recruitment on the labour market and conscription.
F E U D A L M I L I T A R Y M O B I L I Z A T I O N
Feudal military mobilization is based primarily on the non-monetary
relation between the state (or king or sultan) and feudal lords or tribal
chiefs. In return for administrative autonomy, land or property rights or tax
3. An inspiring example is Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power. India and its Armies
(Delhi, 1996) with his daring comparisons (for example p. 28: ‘‘Rather than arguing that Christian,
Islamic, Hispanic or Hindu cultures each have specific, constant, and unique strategic outlooks,
we can look at each political unit in each culture area and ask what the dominant structures are,
what effects they have for the ability to generate military power, what relation the military has to
society, and whether those structures and relations are changing.’’).
4. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, 990–1990 (Cambridge, MA, 1990).
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exemption these lords take care of the provision of soldiers.5 The soldiers
fight under their own commanders, take care of their own armour and/or
horse and are mostly stationed locally. In the period under discussion we
encounter this system especially in the borderlands where the settled parts
of Eurasia meet the steppes and deserts.
The question whether the Ottoman Empire knew true feudalism has
been debated fiercely,6 but the empire’s timar system, which gave members
of the cavalry (sipahis) usufruct of state lands in exchange for military service
certainly had common features with the feudal system, even if the relatively
strong Ottoman state, its monopoly of cereal trade and its support for the
rights of peasants meant that this Ottoman ‘‘gentry’’ always enjoyed less
freedom than its European counterpart. The freedom of action of the sipahi
contingents was also curtailed because during the campaigning season they
were not stationed locally, but formed part of the imperial army. The system
was never employed throughout the sultan’s domains. It was one of the
main instruments for recruitment in the central provinces (Anatolia and the
Balkans) until the late seventeenth century, by which time it had grown
obsolete in two senses: as a medieval technology in the face of gunpowder
armies and as a non-monetary instrument at a time when the state was
desperate for cash income.7
Systems which cannot be called feudal, but which nevertheless comprised
service in exchange for non-monetary rewards are those which involved
armed peasants (Wehrbauern) such as the Cossacks in the Russian Empire.
Some of the levends raised by the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries may have fallen into this category (see below).
Tribal forces of course lost their importance in the main countries of
Europe very early on, unless one regards the social organization of the
Cossacks as ‘‘tribal’’. Although the Ottoman Empire did use tribal forces,
they were never central to its military organization, being auxiliaries of often
5. Because of the analytical point of view chosen, the relation between the feudal lord and his
soldiers will not be discussed here; however, it will be clear that – as in the case of the relation
between the state and its subjects, to be discussed below – here we also have all sorts of variations
between free and unfree relations. A good example are the Hessian subsidy troops employed by
inter alia the Dutch and later especially the English (e.g. in the American War of Liberation) which
can be seen as capitalist hiring of mercenaries. However, within Hessen both feudal obligations and
(in the second half of the eighteenth century) conscription aspects also play an important role:
see Peter K. Taylor, Indentured to Liberty. Peasant Life and the Hessian Military State 1688–1815
(Ithaca and London, 1994).
6. For a sophisticated discussion of state-peasant relations in the Ottoman Empire, see Huri
Islamogˇlu-Inan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire. Agrarian Power Relations and Regional
Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia during the Sixteenth Century (Leiden, 1994), pp. 1–21.
The bibliography gives an excellent introduction into the debate on feudalism.
7. For the transition, see Suraiya Faroqhi, ‘‘Crisis and Change’’, in Halil I˙nalcık with Donald
Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1914 (Cambridge, 1994),
pp. 413–622.
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rather doubtful value. In Persia on the other hand, as Cronin shows, tribal
forces made up the backbone of the army until well into the twentieth
century. When forces modelled on the Russian Cossacks were formed in
the Ottoman Empire and Iran in the late nineteenth century, these were
both recruited from among the tribes.
U N F R E E R E C R U I T M E N T
Unfree recruitment is based on the relation between the state and its unfree
subjects, on conquest and subjugation,8 or on trade in the international
slave market. According to the different origins of the unfree status we may
distinguish between four types:
1 Conscription of serfs in Russia.9 Under Peter the Great the Russian
Empire abandoned free recruitment and drafted subjects – nearly always
serfs – for no less than lifetime service. Those who had to leave their
villages for ever were usually designated by the village community, the
Mir. Serfs could also be condemned to military service by their feudal
lords or by the courts. In 1793 the period of service was lowered to twenty-
five years, but given the low life expectancy at the time this made very
little difference in practice. In 1834 the term of service was reduced to a
de facto period of twelve years and in 1855 to ten. In 1874 universal con-
scription on the modern pattern was introduced, an innovation only made
possible by the abolition of serfdom in 1861.
2 The roughest and least regulated of the systems of unfree recruitment was
that of the ‘‘press’’ under which able-bodied men were simply rounded
up and requisitioned for army or navy. It is documented for several
navies, the British and Ottoman (who used it in the Greek archipelago)
among them, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but seems to
have been used mainly in wartime emergencies rather than as a regular
instrument of recruitment.10
3 The system of military slaves which was widely used in the whole Middle
East from the ninth until the nineteenth century. It has been said that
the use of slave armies followed from needs inherent in Islamic organi-
zation,11 but if we take into account the widespread use of unfree enrol-
8. We have to keep in mind that only after the Crimean War did the Ottomans cease to enslave
prisoners of war or enemy subjects: see Y.H. Erdem, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise,
1800–1909 (Basingstoke and London, 1996). However, in the nineteenth century these slaves no
longer were recruited for the army or the navy.
9. Henry H. Hirschbiel, ‘‘Conscription in Russia’’, The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet
History, vol. VIII (Gulf Breeze, FL, 1978), pp. 4–9; Peter Kolchin, Unfree Labor: American Slavery
and Russian Serfdom (Cambridge, MA, 1987), pp. 42, 204, 367–368.
10. Christopher Lloyd, The British Seaman, 1200–1860: A Social Survey (London, 1968).
11. Daniel Pipes, Slave Soldiers and Islam. The Genesis of a Military System (New Haven, CT, and
London, 1981), p. 100.
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ment outside the Muslim world, this conclusion seems doubtful. Rather,
it seems that the actual form of enslavement was traditional in this part
of the world, not enslavement as such. Broadly speaking, two types of
slave army were employed in the Islamic world. The older one, for which
the term mamluk is used, denotes well-paid professional soldiers who had
been bought or captured outside the Islamic world, primarily in the
Turkic steppes or in the Caucasus. The other, newer, system was that
employed by the Ottomans from the late fourteenth century onwards,
under which boys from Christian peasant families in the Balkans and
Anatolia were enslaved and recruited for the Janissary corps (from Yeni
˙eri – New Army).12 In both cases the logic of the system seems to have
been that people were recruited from among those furthest removed from
the establishment13 (although, of course, in both cases the slave soldiers
developed into a power elite themselves).
4 The use of convicts and slaves on the galleys.14 This method was
employed primarily on the Mediterranean galleys of all powers until well
into the eighteenth century, when sailing ships had made galleys obsolete
as a fighting force anyway. As is well known, in the battle of Lepanto
(1571) all contesting fleets were heavily dependent on Greek, Albanian,
Bosnian and other slaves from the Balkans.15 Outside the Mediterranean,
the Portuguese seem to have used slaves on their sailing ships, as occasion-
ally did the Dutch on their East Indiamen.16
R E C R U I T M E N T O N T H E L A B O U R M A R K E T
Recruitment through the labour market is based on the relation between
the state and the (national or international) labour market. Remuneration
can take the form of wages or prize-money, booty or less directly material
12. Ibid.; Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power. India and its Armies (Delhi, 1996),
pp. 114–115, 119–123; I˙smail Hakkı Uzunc¸ars¸ılı, Kapıkulu Ocakları (Ankara, 1943–1944), 2 vols.
13. This is the reason why the Ottomans rejected the possibility of recruiting the children of
townspeople.
14. See Andre´ Zysberg, Les gale´riens. Vies et destins de 6000 forcats sur les gale`res de France 1680–
1748 (Paris, 1987); Frederick C. Lane, Venice. A Maritime Republic (Baltimore, 1973), pp. 364–379,
414–415.
15. In the eighteenth century galleys vanished from the Mediterranean but became popular in the
Baltic. There the Russians deployed serfs under their new conscription system, but other nations
used free oarsmen.
16. Jan Lucassen, ‘‘The International Maritime Labour Market: Sixteenth-Nineteenth Centuries’’,
in Paul van Royen, Jaap R. Bruijn and Jan Lucassen (eds), ‘‘Those Emblems of Hell’’? European
Sailors and the Maritime Labour Market, 1570–1870 (St John’s, Newfoundland, 1997), pp. 11–23;
K. van der Tempel, ‘‘ ‘Wij hebben amok in ons schip’: Aziaten in opstand tijdens drie terugreizen
op het einde van de achttiende eeuw’’, in J.R. Bruijn and E.S. van Eyck van Heslinga (eds),
Muiterij. Oproer en berechting op schepen van de VOC (Haarlem, 1980), pp. 123–147.
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gains such as secular or religious honour.17 Two ways of hiring soldiers are
possible: either individual and direct recruitment or collective and indirect
recruitment. As in all crafts and professions, some regions or ethnic com-
munities can specialize in this trade. A good example is provided by the
individual recruitment of mercenaries as it was employed by many great
powers in Europe from the Middle Ages onwards. The recruits could be
local, but especially in times of war they could come from quite far away.
In the early modern period the Venetians, the Spanish, the French, the
Dutch and – after the Glorious Revolution – also the English used merce-
naries. Irish, Scots, Swiss and inhabitants of some German states like Hesse,
Hanover and Brunswick specialized in this trade. Their religious conviction
could influence their attractiveness to foreign employers.18 An international
maritime labour market, also involving the navies, seems to have come into
being later. In the early modern period only the Dutch Republic could
really boast of having established one, to be followed only from the mid-
nineteenth century by the Americans and then the British. Over the last
century a global maritime labour market was established, but by then it had
lost its significance for the navies.
In the Ottoman Empire, the most common type of recruitment on the
labour market was that of the levends. These were generally young landless
villagers in the pay of the state or provincial military leaders. When they
were self-employed, there was often very little to distinguish them from
robber bands. When its traditional core forces became less and less useful,
the empire, in spite of its ideological attachment to the concept of a sharp
division between an armed governing elite (askerıˆ) and unarmed productive
subjects (reaya), came to rely rather heavily on these troops.19
We can also discern certain ethnic groups which specialized in this mili-
tary trade, notably Albanians and Bosnians. Whatever their legal status and
mode of payment, by the eighteenth century to all intents and purposes
these were hired mercenaries. A man like the Albanian Mehmed Ali Pasha,
whose army is the subject of Fahmy’s article, can definitely be described as
a successful soldier of fortune.
17. Gregory Hanlon, ‘‘The Decline of a Provincial Military Aristocracy: Siena 1560–1740’’, Past
and Present, 155 (May 1997), pp. 64–108.
18. For Hessians see Taylor, Indentured to Liberty; for Scots see T.C. Smout, N.C. Landsman and
T.M. Devine, ‘‘Scottish Emigration in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’’, in Nicholas
Canny (ed.), Europeans on the Move. Studies on European Migration, 1500–1800 (Oxford, 1994), pp.
76–112; Thomas C. Smout, ‘‘Scots and Emigrants in Europe, 1400–1700’’, in Simonetta Cavacioc-
chi (ed.), Le Migrazioni in Europa secc. XIII–XVIII (Prato, 1994), pp. 659–669 and Dmitry G.
Fedosov, ‘‘Russia’s Scottish Clans’’, in ibid., pp. 861–866; for Irish see Robert A. Stradling, ‘‘Mili-
tary Recruitment and Movement as a Form of Migration: Spain and its Irish Mercenaries, 1598–
1665’’, in ibid., pp. 477–490 and L.M. Cullen, ‘‘The Irish Diaspora of the Seventeenth and Eight-
eenth Centuries’’, in Canny, Europeans on the Move, pp. 113–149.
19. Johannes Hendrikus Kramers [and William Griswold], ‘‘Levend’’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol.
VIII (Leiden, 1986), pp. 728–729.
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Collective recruitment with the help of intermediaries was also common.
It is not always possible to make a clear distinction between this form and
individual recruitment, but in the cases of subsidy regiments and privateers,
the form is mostly collective. The employment of privateers – essentially
pirates sailing for booty under legal sanction by a state – continued until
the 1850s both in the Christian and in the Muslim world.20 In the Ottoman
case, the best-known example is that of the corsairs from the Barbary coast
(Algiers, Tunis, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica), who in their turn employed
free locals (Arabs and Turks) and slaves (including captured Christians).
Outside Ottoman jurisdiction, the privateers of Sale´ and Tangiers earned
their reputation as merciless hunters of the sea.21 A well-known example
from the other side is that of the Maltese. The equivalent of these naval
mercenaries on land were the ‘‘Uskoks’’ on the Ottoman-Austrian border,
who could fight on both sides.22 The Ottomans also used locally hired
mercenaries on the Danube.
Bedouin tribal forces were nearly always free actors, who were paid collec-
tively for their services (although it has to be said that they were more often
paid for not attacking the Ottomans’ own caravan trade, rather than for
fighting in the sultan’s cause).23
As all these examples make clear, different systems nearly always coexisted
within one state. There is no clear-cut development from a ‘‘primitive’’ to a
‘‘modern’’ system through well-established intermediate stages.
C O N S C R I P T I O N – U N I V E R S A L A N D O T H E R W I S E
We now come to our main topic: recruitment through conscription.
Although essentially a modern system with its roots in the French revo-
lutionary period, the phenomenon has predecessors in Europe. In order to
understand the novelty of the system, we have first of all to make a distinc-
tion between indirect and direct conscription.
Indirect conscription
Before national, centralized and theoretically universal conscription was
introduced, we can already discern older systems of indirect conscription
which share some of its characteristics. Peter the Great’s conscript army was
20. Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns. State-Building and Extraterritorial
Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, NJ, 1994).
21. Geoffery Fisher, Barbary Legend. War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1415–1830 (Oxford,
1957).
22. Catherine Wendy Bracewell, The Uskoks of Senj. Piracy, Banditry and the Holy War in the
Sixteenth-Century Adriatic (Ithaca and London, 1992).
23. Suraiya Faroqhi, Pilgrims and Sultans. The Hajj under the Ottomans 1517–1683 (London, 1994),
pp. 54–73.
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recruited in an indirect manner in that the great landowners were charged
with filling their complement of recruits and largely left free in the choice
of their actual conscripts. The actual selection was then mostly left to the
village elders in the mir. The bunichah system introduced in Persia in the
1840s (and described by Cronin) was also of this type.
In large parts of Europe, from the Middle Ages onwards, we see local
militia systems, mostly organized separately in the towns and in the country-
side. In medieval and early modern European towns craft guilds often pro-
vided a number of civic tasks such as fire fighting and local defence. In the
Dutch Republic more professional militias (schutterijen) took over the task
of defence, while in Venice craft guilds could even have offensive duties
when they had to take their share in manning the galleys.24 The countryside
also often had militias for self-defence.25 Villagers were often loosely
organized and ill-trained, but the aptitudes which enabled them to survive
in harsh circumstances often gave them a natural ability as soldiers,
especially in remote and mountainous areas.
In the pre-modern Middle East towns had never achieved the corporate
identity and autonomy which became the norm in late medieval Europe.
Middle Eastern states did not recognize the rights of citizens (an alien con-
cept in itself) to arm and defend themselves. Nevertheless something
approaching a town militia came into being when the Janissary army lost
its original standing and professional character in the late sixteenth century.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the corps developed close links
with the craft guilds and in effect became a part-time militia of shopowners,
ready to defend their interests against encroachments on the part of the
state, but almost useless as an instrument of that state in warfare. Indeed,
finding alternatives to the Janissaries became a prime concern of the Otto-
man government.
In spite of the theoretical monopolization of violence on the part of the
state, the Ottoman (but also the Persian) countryside was quite heavily
armed. The Ottoman state made use of this state of affairs when it began
to recruit large numbers of young armed peasants as levends in the seven-
teenth century and disarming the countryside was as much a cause for
resistance in the nineteenth century as the introduction of universal con-
scription.
Direct conscription
These systems depend on the relation between the state and its individual
free subjects. In principle, remuneration only exists in the form of subsis-
tence, although the state is responsible for clothing and equipment. If pay-
24. Lane, Venice.
25. See Taylor, Indentured to Liberty.
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ment occurs, it is additional (e.g. in the shape of a sign-up premium) and
very low. Early examples of conscription (other than that of Peter the Great,
which, as we have seen, can be termed ‘‘indirect’’) can be found, for instance
in the conscription navale introduced by Colbert in the French navy to
replace the earlier press-gangs and in Hesse and Hanover, but the break-
through of conscription came in the context of the French Revolution.
The army of the French Republic at first was a motley collection of
remnants of the royal army of the Bourbons, militias and volunteers, but
this clearly could not fulfil the military requirements of revolutionary France
when it was attacked on all sides. The famous convention decree of August
1793 introduced in all of France the individual obligation (and right) of
every French citizen to be a soldier. In doing so, it of course brought with
it a need to define clearly who was a French citizen and who was not. At
least in theory, the point of departure was the armement ge´ne´ral du peuple.
This first leve´e en masse of 1793, through which an army of 400,000 was
raised, did not really constitute the start of conscription in practice, how-
ever. The obligation to serve was a general one, but by and large those who
served were volunteers. Real conscription was introduced five years later,
when revolutionary fervour had worn off and the number of volunteers had
dwindled, under the Loi Jourdan of September 1798. The system was
exploited to the limits of its possibilities – and beyond – by Napoleon
Bonaparte.26
After the restoration, most countries, including France, largely abandoned
universal conscription in exchange for a standing army of professionals,
reinforced with long-term conscripts from the poorest sections of the popu-
lation (precisely at the time when the French officers who figure in Fahmy’s
article introduced the conscription system in the Egyptian army). In France,
the middle class was almost completely exempt under a system which
allowed those who were drafted to send, or pay for, a replacement. This, in
fact, is a universal feature of early conscription systems in countries as far
apart as France and Russia and it faced the state and its ruling elite with
the dilemma that for its survival it depended on an army recruited from
among those who had the least stake in society and might be politically
least reliable (in addition to being the worst educated). This problem
became more acute with the rise of socialism in the later nineteenth century.
As Zu¨rcher’s article shows, in the Ottoman Empire exemptions were a par-
ticularly intractable problem, as – at least until 1909 – Christians and Jews
were not expected to serve and the burden fell on the Muslim population
alone.
Conscription systems such as the French, which relied on relatively long
periods of service (eight years and over) resulted in relatively large and
26. See Alan Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters. The Army and French Society during the Revolution
and Empire (Oxford, 1989).
Jan Lucassen and Erik Jan Zu¨rcher414
expensive standing armies, which, however, could not be strengthened in
wartime by calling up a trained reserve. It also kept a large number of
males away from the labour market during their most productive years. This
problem was solved in Prussia by the army reforms which were introduced
gradually after the defeat at Jena in 1806 and which resulted in the Law on
Conscription of September 1814. Under this law, the male population was
required to serve between one and three years in the regular frontline army,
followed by service in the first and second class reserve (Landwehr) and
finally in the Landsturm militia, which would only be activated in case of
an enemy invasion. This hugely influential model combined the advantages
of a relatively small standing army manned largely by professionals and
volunteers with the availability of a large pool of trained reserves who could
be called up in case of war. For the proper working of the system the
linkages between the regular army and the reserve were essential. This later
led to the dissolution of the separate structure of the reserve, with reservists
filling out regular units rather than serving in their own, a practice followed
by the Ottomans on the eve of the First World War.27 The Prussian system
proved its effectiveness in the wars of 1866 and 1870 and as a result all
European countries, except the United Kingdom, adopted ‘‘universal’’ com-
pulsory military service as a defensive measure even in peacetime. In the
Ottoman Empire the conscription system introduced in 1844 was modelled
on the Prussian example and after 1870 Prussian/German influence grew
markedly. Eventually, the system became well-nigh universal. Even those
countries where there was great reluctance to employ it, like the United
States and Britain succumbed. The US used the system temporarily during
the Civil War and in the great wars of the twentieth century, finally aban-
doning ‘‘the draft’’ towards the end of the Vietnam War in 1969. Britain
adopted conscription when Kitchener’s army ran short of volunteers in 1916
and even reintroduced ‘‘national service’’ after the Second World War, only
reverting to a professional army in 1963.
Military considerations apart, conscript armies have been seen as prime
instruments for nation-building. This was already recognized in the nine-
teenth century, but it became especially important in the new nation states
created during the break-up of empires after the First World War and
during the decolonization process after the Second World War. Cronin
points to the importance of this factor in the Middle East at the start of
her article.
There are a number of prerequisites for the successful introduction of a
conscript army. First of all, a reliable census has to be in place to determine
27. Heinz Stu¨big, ‘‘Die Wehrverfassung Preussens in der Reformzeit. Wehrpflicht im Spannungs-
feld von Restauration und Revolution 1815–1860’’, in Roland G. Foerster (ed.), Die Wehrpflicht.
Entstehung, Erscheinungsformen und politisch-milita¨rische Wirkung (Munich, 1994), pp. 39–53; Stig
Fo¨rster, ‘‘Milita¨r und staatsbu¨rgerliche Partizipation. Die allgemeine Wehrpflicht im Deutschen
Kaiserreich 1871–1914’’, in ibid., pp. 55–70.
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where the potential manpower can be found. This required a sizeable
growth in the state bureaucracy even outside the purely military apparatus.
Then an efficient apparatus for the actual recruitment and, in almost every
case, efficient sanctions (such as cantonnement of troops in houses of those
who refuse to turn up, or hostage-taking of family members) to combat
desertion have to be put in place.28 In most cases service was determined by
the drawing of lots, in which case a system of lottery has to be introduced
and executed. The troops have to be moved, fed, clothed and armed in
much larger numbers than before, which presupposes a certain degree of
economic efficiency, or even industrialization, which was completely non-
existent in the Ottoman Empire or Persia. Raw recruits from the country-
side have to be educated and trained so as not to lower the efficiency of the
standing professional army too much – quantity should not endanger qual-
ity. Some of the fiercest resistance to general conscription has in fact come
from within the professional army for this very reason.
The use of an army of conscripts also had far-reaching consequences for
the way war was waged and the way it was presented to the population. As
war now involved the whole population, mobilizing and motivating that
population through the use of propaganda acquired an altogether novel
importance (evolving into the concept of the ‘‘Home Front’’ in the First
World War). Likewise, breaking the enemy’s will (and that is, after all,
according to Clausewitz the ultimate goal of any warfare) now also involved
breaking the will to resist of the enemy population, not only of the army
in the field. The concept of a ‘‘nation in arms’’ almost inevitably led to
different behaviour of the army vis-a`-vis the enemy population as was dem-
onstrated during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Guerrilla warfare had its
origins in the aftermath of the French Revolution (when the Spanish first
used the term for their popular resistance against Napoleon’s occupying
forces) and the use of franc-tireurs by the French in the 1870 war stood in
this tradition. It blurred the distinction between soldiers and civilians even
further and led to hostage-taking and random shootings by the Germans
which presaged the tragedies of Oradour and My-Lai in the twentieth cen-
tury.
The reliability of the conscript armies was always a worry in the minds
of the General Staff, though in the event even the enormous hordes of
conscripts which were thrown into battle in the First World War proved
remarkably resilient. Only after three years of almost incredibly ferocious
fighting did the first major signs of dissent appear (the famous mutiny of
May 1917 in the French army), but even then it was fairly easily put down.
But in a sense the generals were right, of course: the conscripts were essen-
tially civilians in uniform and by sheer weight of numbers they tended to
28. See for examples in the Netherlands: Alex Barten and Frans Kraan, Stelligen Onwil. Dienstwei-
gering tijdens de Belgische Opstand (Amsterdam, 1996).
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determine the atmosphere in the armies more and more. In the long run
this necessitated a different style of leadership, at least in those countries
where the population became more literate, wealthy and mobile. The Amer-
ican armies in both world wars and the contemporary NATO forces are
examples of this trend. In exchange for the willingness of the populations
to fight and to keep on fighting, hard-pressed governments had to make
promises of social justice (‘‘A land fit for heroes to live in’’). In the aftermath
both of the First World War and the Second World War these promises
were at least partly fulfilled, leading to the welfare state after 1945.
T H E O P T I O N S O F T H E R E C R U I T
Turning from the state and its concerns to those at the receiving end of its
policies, we should now try to catalogue the possible reactions to military
recruitment, to see which specific types of resistance may be expected in
which situations.
The most outspoken resistance may be expected where new forms of
recruitment are introduced, where the rules are changed dramatically (as in
the case of the introduction of conscription) or when circumstances change
dramatically, e.g. when war breaks out or when wars are lost.
The choice whether to resist at all and the choice of a particular form of
resistance depend essentially on two things: the assessment of the balance
between advantages and disadvantages of military service and the available
resources and repertoires of action. Both factors cannot be analysed simply
as a result of individual calculations on the part of the recruit. As his
immediate relatives are severely affected as well, the resistance should really
be analysed in the framework of household strategies. The way resistance
will express itself is heavily dependent on the repertoire of action that is
available, both within the community of origin and in the army.
What may be an advantage to one young man in his prime, may be a
disadvantage to another. Where the prospective mercenary, his relatives and
his future bride will see the army as a (rare) job opportunity or a possibility
to enhance their status, most conscripts and their families will blame the
army for loss of income or worse. The disadvantage will be all the greater
if service in the army involves immediate risks such as undernourishment,
disease, mistreatment (spectacular in the case of Mehmed Ali’s army) or
danger. Obviously all of these aggravating circumstances count more in
times of war than in peacetime. The longer the service, the worse the pros-
pects for the recruit of ever returning to his village. It is telling that in
Russian villages, the departure of the recruits was sometimes ‘‘celebrated’’
with a funeral ceremony. In the Ottoman Empire, a whole body of military
songs exists, which depicts conscription as a death sentence.29
29. Erik Jan Zu¨rcher, ‘‘Little Mehmet in the Desert. The Ottoman Soldier’s Experience’’, in Hugh
Cecil and Peter Liddle (eds), Facing Armageddon. The First World War Experienced (London,
1996), pp. 230–241.
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The available resources of avoidance and resistance are clearly linked to
the way in which recruitment is organized. If we restrict ourselves to con-
scription only, we have to take into consideration the degree to which the
state was able to muster the bureaucratic force to execute the system effec-
tively. As noted earlier, this involved registration, medical examinations,
regulations about exemptions, the drawing of lots, the actual enrolment,
transport and drilling. Obviously, making use of each of these stages in the
process to avoid recruitment is far easier in a state, like the Ottoman in
the nineteenth and the Persian in the early twentieth century, where the
bureaucracy was still being created than in one of the established bureau-
cratic states of Europe.
Opportunities are not the only determining factor, however. Which
forms of resistance are used is ‘‘path-dependent’’, in other words it depends
on the existing traditions of avoidance and resistance in the army and navy
and in society at large.
Resistance can take on many forms. The recruit can try to avoid recruit-
ment by going into hiding. In Anatolia and the Balkans, ‘‘leaving for the
mountains’’ to escape the demands of the state was an age-old tradition.
From the seventeenth century onwards, the lowland tracts close to the main
roads had become a wasteland and communities had withdrawn into the
mountains. Brigandage was very widespread even in the early twentieth
century. Another strategy, available to those with enough means, was leaving
the country temporarily or for good (or taking on a different nationality as
many Ottoman Greeks and Armenians did after 1909); an Ottoman Muslim
recruit could convert to Christianity or – the opposite solution – perform
the hajj. He could mutilate himself in order to be sent home (a strategy
employed in all armies, but apparently very widespread in Mehmed Ali’s
Egyptian army).
Of course, the soldier can try to desert, either on the way to the front or
towards the enemy. The first seems to have been very widespread in the
Ottoman army, both because of its lax controls and because it was socially
quite acceptable to the villagers. The second was rare, at least if the enemy
was Christian.
Soldiers contemplating resistance of any kind of course have to take into
account the risks and the penalty that may have to be paid. These penalties
were always more severe than in civilian life because soldiers are dealt with
under martial, that is to say criminal, law.30
Strategies like avoidance or desertion are largely individual but they do
require the support of household, family or village. If desertion is not an
option, the recruit can strike or refuse to carry out orders, and, finally, he can
rebel, that is to say join a mutiny. All of these are collective actions which
30. Outside the Anglo-Saxon world, where breach of contract still fell under criminal law until
very late (in Britain until 1875–1877), in most European countries labour contracts (except for
sailors) fell under civil law. This is an important distinction between military and civilian jobs.
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require organization. As the risks of overt resistance are great, these ultimate
means will be avoided as long as possible. If practised these will tend to take
the form of peaceful demonstrations and petitions, rather than open revolt. In
these, too, families can play a part. As they are not under the constraints of
military discipline, they can often protest more easily than the men them-
selves. In the case of a Dutch naval mutiny in 1779, the wives of the seamen
sent an anonymous letter to the admiralty board reminding its members that
their wearing of expensive wigs was made possible only because they – the
wives – had nothing but cabbage stalks to eat (‘‘want voor ons geld soo draegen
de heeren pruijke en wij moeten eete koolstruijke’’).31 If an open revolt comes
to pass, the participants will act as one unit, avoiding individual liability. A
clear example from naval mutinies is the so-called ‘‘Round Robin’’.32 This is a
declaration on paper which was described in 1716 as follows:
They take a large Sheet of Paper, and strike two Circles, one a good distance
without the other; in the inner Circle, they will write what they have a mind to
have done; and between the two Circular Lines, they write their Names, in and
out, against the Circles; beginning like the four Cardinal points of the Compass,
right opposite to each other, and so continue till the Paper is filled; which appears
in a Circle, and no one can be said to be first, so that they all are equally guilty:
Which I believe to be contrived to keep ’em all firm to their purpose, when once
they have signed it; and if discovered, no one can be excused, by saying, he was
the last that signed it, and he had not done it without great Persuasion.
Different armies have had to face different forms of resistance. In France,
for example, the General Staff was convinced that the entire army was
‘‘rotten’’ when desertions increased forty times from around 500 in 1914 to
21,000 in 1917,33 but the much smaller Ottoman army by 1918 had half a
million deserters. On the other hand, mutinies were almost unheard of in
the Ottoman army of the First World War, even when the soldiers were
barefoot and starving.34 Clearly, here the ‘‘path’’, the pre-existing strategy of
which the soldiers could avail themselves, was missing. Mutinies had been
a common phenomenon in the pre-modern Ottoman army. Many coups
d’etat had started with the Janissaries turning over their soup kettles. But
the conscript armies of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire were armies of
peasants who came from a very different tradition from that of the town-
31. Jaap R. Bruijn, The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Columbia, SC,
1993), p. 206.
32. Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea. Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the
Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–1750 (Cambridge, 1987), p. 234; D.L.M. Weijers, ‘‘‘Dappere
waterleeuwen versus schelmen’: een muiterij in Perzische wateren, 1733’’, in Bruijn and van Eyck
van Heslinga, Muiterij, pp. 44–57.
33. Leonard Smith, ‘‘The French High Command and the Mutinies of Spring 1917’’, in Cecil and
Liddle, Facing Armageddon, pp. 79–92.
34. Erik Jan Zu¨rcher, ‘‘Between Death and Desertion. The Experience of the Ottoman Soldier in
World War I’’, Turcica, 28 (1996), pp. 235–258.
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and city-based Janissaries with their strong esprit de corps. Strikes were not
unknown in the empire. Closing down the bazar was a very traditional
means of protest (it was still practised during the Iranian revolution and the
Intifada) and industrial strikes had proliferated after 1908, but they were
limited to the few centres (Salonica, Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa) where a small
industrial workforce had come into being in the late nineteenth century.35
Again, both traditions were alien to the village population which made up
the bulk of the army.
Because of the enormous difficulties and penalties involved in all forms
of resistance, here, too, we have to abstain from a one-sided analysis of
recruits as individuals, detached from their communities of origin. These
communities are important, not only in weighing advantages against disad-
vantages (although, admittedly, in the case of conscription the disadvantages
far outweighed any advantages), but also in the acts of avoidance and resis-
tance. Emigration, flight, hiding, self-mutilation, bribery – all of these can
hardly be practised without the help of one’s relatives. Because the actual
or future household is at stake, all these acts can be interpreted as household
strategies.
Anxiety about the survival of the families they left behind was also often
a morale-sapping issue for the conscripts. The detailed provisions made by
the Ottoman government for ‘‘families left without breadwinner’’ (muinsiz
aile) show the official concerns on this point. At least this was a more benign
sort of attention than that displayed by the Russian government, which in
the 1830s launched a propaganda campaign praising mothers who turned in
their fugitive sons and awarding informers a special silver medal inscribed
‘‘for diligence’’.36
The following three essays involve a journey through time and space. Khaled
Fahmy presents the story of the army of Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt, who
pioneered conscription in the Middle East. Erik Jan Zu¨rcher describes how
the Ottoman Empire organized its recruiting system when it answered the
Pasha’s challenge. Stephanie Cronin takes us further, to Iran where con-
scription only became an issue in the early twentieth century, causing wide-
spread resistance.
It is hoped that these studies combined will allow the reader to see that
both where conscription as part of the formation of modern states is con-
cerned and where the focus is on the repertoire of resistance of individuals,
households and communities, there are striking similarities not only
between the different countries of the Middle East but also between the
Middle East and Europe. The logic of state formation and the reactions it
encounters clearly transcend boundaries of civilizations.
35. See Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire,
1881–1908 (New York, 1983).
36. Kolchin, Unfree Labor, pp. 282–283.
